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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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28 May 1965

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USSR: (At least part of Khrushchev's ambitious chemical program has been modified. 7

An official Soviet journal has indicated that Khrushchev's 1970 production goal for fertilizers has been lowered by 10 to 20 percent. This implies that earlier plans for constructing new fertilizer plants have been cut back and that chemical investment will be commensurately reduced.

It is not yet clear what the over-all plans for the chemical program will be. There are also indications that the 1970 plans for some synthetic products are being revised downward, but the goal for pesticides remains the same. The over-all priority accorded the chemical industry apparently is still very high.

Rumania - Warsaw Pact: Soviet Marshal Grechko, commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, has again turned up in Rumania, possibly in connection with Rumanian differences with the pact organization.

Reports of Rumanian dissatisfaction with the pact were first noted immediately after Grechko's trip to Rumania last fall. Rumania was reported to have disagreed with the USSR over pact matters at the 19-20 January pact conference in Warsaw.

The specific issues involved are not known. However, the differences have arisen at a time when Bucharest has adopted an increasingly independent position in its relations with Moscow.

Apparently Grechko has made little headway in accomplishing his mission, which seems to be of an urgent nature. Bucharest's only public mention of his presence was a brief announcement that he talked with Premier Maurer on 24 May. The talks were described only as "friendly."

In addition to broader questions Grechko could have been discussing problems concerning Warsaw Pact exercises in the Balkans.

France-Germany: The inconclusive result of the talks on 24 May between the French and German foreign ministers tends to confirm the view that De Gaulle and Erhard will be unable to resolve their differences in their meeting scheduled for 11 June.

The principal item of discussion was the recent French efforts to "Europeanize" the German question. Schroeder was not convinced by Couve de Murville's assurance that Paris had never envisaged eliminating the US from reunification negotiations. According to a ranking French official, this issue is almost certain to be taken up again in the June talks. 1

The resolution of conflicting stands on European political integration was left for further action in the De Gaulle - Erhard meetings. Couve reiterated France's unwillingness to attend a summit meeting of the Six until there is some guarantee of a successful outcome.

In discussions by subordinate officials on essential EEC questions, Paris still refused to give the European Parliament power over the EEC budget or to permit the EEC to receive customs revenues. A Bonn official comments, however, that he believes France's stake in agricultural integration will lead it to take a more conciliatory attitude in later discussions.

Congo-OCAM: Leaders of nine moderate French-speaking African governments, meeting in the Ivory Coast, on 26 May declared Congo (Leopoldville) a member of the African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM). This move, in the works for several weeks, ends the diplomatic isolation of the Tshombé regime in Africa, but is also likely to contribute to sharpening the divisions between radical and moderate African states. At least one and possibly three of the five OCAM member states which did not attend the 26 May meeting can be expected to refuse to recognize the legality of the pro-Tshombé action.

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Colombia: The government appears to have restored order in all major cities following the student riots which precipitated the imposition of a state of siege. The students achieved one of their principal goals when President Valencia requested the resignation of the rector of the University of Antioquia. The situation at the university remains unsettled, however, as many members of the faculty have threatened to resign if the resignation is accepted by the university council.

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